There is overwhelming evidence that medication errors present a risk to patients. This risk is highest in the intensive care unit (ICU) setting and even greater when medications are administered via an infusion putnp. Standard pumps will not alert for, or prevetit, drug calculation, drug unit, button push, or multiple of ten errors when medication delivery data is inputted. However, the literature suggests that smart pumps programmed with hard (unchangeable) limits can significantly reduce drug errors at the point of administration. Staff at St George's Hospital paediatric ICU wanted to implement an infusion pump system that would be immediately effective in reducing medication errors at the point of administration. This article presents an overview of the relevant literature together with clinical examples from the authors' ICU, which demonstrates their experiences with smart pumps. It is the authors' firm belief that smart infusion technology sets a new minimum safety standard for intensive care.
T he term 'smart pump' was originally adopted by the Institute for Safe Medical Practices (ISMP) to describe an infusion punip with an associated drug library that contains correct parameters t~or all medications to be delivered by the pump (Snodgniss. 201)5). If a programming entry is attempted outside the pre-set parameters, the pump denies the instrucrion and alerts the cHnician.thereby preventing the error. As long as the smart pump is programmed with hard (unchangeable) limits, or the user does not override any soft (changeable) limits, the pump can potentially prevent the implementation of a medication error outside these preset limits, therefore increasing patient safetv' .
Standard infusion pumps are reliable if regularly serviced and maintained, but they will only deliver whatever dose/ time/concentration has been programmed into it. So the wrong touch of a button can programme a dose of lOOmg/hour instead of lOmg/hour, or set the time of infusion for 1 hour rather than \0 hours. A clinician would never give lOO tablets to a patient instead of a correct dose of one tablet, and yet 100-fold errors can be made when giving intravenous (IV) drugs via an infusion pump (Thurman et al, 2004; Hicks and Becker. 2006) .
In this article the authors review and analyse the literature surrounding the potential tor improved patient safety with the introduction of smart pumps and support this with some clinical examples 6-om St George's Hospital paediatric intensive care unit (ICU).
Current state of affairs
A review of the literature will leave the reader in no doubt that medication errors present a risk to patients in terms of morbidity and mortality ( Table /) .As Smith and Haig (2005) put it, 'safet\-is like peeling an onion; the more you look, the more you find, and each layer makes you cry'.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) found that hospitalized patients are at risk of at least one medication error per patient day (Aspden et al. 2007) , and many commentar>-papers paint a picture of prolific medication error incidence. using phrases such as.'the single leading cause of medical injuries', or'principal contributors to adverse events causing significant harm to hospitalized patients' (Reves, 2003; Apkon et al. 2004) . However, as the literature is explored, further complexities in assessing the level of medication errors become clear.
Under reporting is a recognized phenomenon that affects both incidence and prevalence studies. Schneider (2004) estimated that as few as 1 in 101) medication errors are reported, and Jha et al (1998) demonstrated that the per cent of voluntarily reported severe adverse drug events (ADEs) was significantly lower than that ot severe ADEs picked up by computer monitoring or intensive chart review (4% compared with 49% and 60% respectively of 281 severe ADEs in 21 964 patient-days).
Medication error rates vary depending on medical area, and tend to be at their highest in the ICU. This is not entirely surprising because of the increased number ot drugs given to ICU patients, and because most ot these are given by IV infusion. Cullen et al (1997) found that the rate of preventable and potential adverse drug events was nearly twice as high in ICUs as in non-ICUs (P<O.ll]), and that the medical ICU rate was significantly higher than the surgical ICU rate (25 events compared with 14 events per 101*0 patient days. P<0.05). A Norwegian study found that more than twice as many errors occurred in the ICU than the postoperative unit, even though more than 20 times the number of study patients came from the postoperative area (Flaatten and Hevroy, 1999) . Data from other studies showthat 92% of infusion pump related errors in three hospitals occurred in ICU (Williams and Maddox. 2005) and that 59% of all reprogramming alerts occurred in the ICU. compared with less than 5% in medical and surgical wards (Long, 2004) .
Another factor is the potential severity' of medication errors. In a study in the United States (US), the incidence of actual ADEs and potential ADEs from 4031 adult admissions over a 6-month period was 5.5' Xi and 6.5% Medication errors occurred in 0.15% of admissions -56% of these were iV and 8% were 10-fbld errors 5.7% drug error incidence and 1.1% incidence of medication errors with significant potential for injuring a patient 54% of potential ADEs involved IV drugs.
In a I -year period for a hospital that uses 1000 infusion pumps, the use of smart pumps would result in approximately 18500 alerts and 4000 programming changes
Prescribing error rate= 1.5%, with 0.4% potentially serious errors.
Prospective ethnographic study using disguised observation of nurses who prepared and administered IV dnjgs in 10 hospital wards.
Review of 1846 medication errors Involving infusion devices
8-month review of drug infusions covering 14000 patient days 49% of 430 IV drug doses had at least one error, including 70% of IV boius doses that were administered too rapidly. 1% were potentially severe.
8.7% medication errors resulted in harm. The majority of errors were due to incorrect programming.
157 smart pump alerts resulted in discontinuation of initial entry. Seventeen of these could have been lethal had the ADEs not been intercepted.
59% of all reprogramming alerts occurred in ICU compared with less than 5% in medicai/surgiciü wards Interdiscipiinary data from an 18-month US study of 183 smart infusion pumps Assessment of 1117 alert events from a smart pump 6 1 % of events occun^ed In ÍCU. compared with 22% in system linked through a wireless network medical and surgical units. 'Dose above maximum' was the largest category of alerts (33%).
Point prevalence study to compare medication, dose 66.9% of IV infusions pump medications had one and infusion rate on IV pumps with the prescribed dose and rate. 426 medications were observed. , 1995) . However. 1% of~ these were fatal. 12*X> 1 i fe-th reciten ing. 30% serious, and 57% significant. If inedicaticin errors li;ive a disproportionate potential to cause h.iriii then the consequences from even a small perceiitLige ot errors are likely to be serious. In one 8-nionth review of drug infusions covering 1400(1 patient days. 157 smart pump alerts resulted in discontinuation of the initial entry with subsequent reprogramming to .1 different inkision rate. Seventeen of these could have been lethal had the ADEs not been inteRX'pted (Malai; hock et al. 20(14) .
Of all the différent drug errors, those im-c)lviiig the IV route make up one of the largest categories and appear to carry the greatest risk. Kaushal et al (2001) found that 54% of potential ADEs involved IV drugs, and Taxis and Barber (2003) found that 49% of 4311 IV drug doses had at least one error, including 10% of IV bolus doses that were administered too rapidly. Of these. 1% were potentially severe.
Even though IV medications, as a whole. carry the greatest risk, the sub-category that is associated with an even higher potential for error and an even greater severit\" outcome is continuous IV infusions. Calculations involved in delivering continuous infusions are more complex and more prone to error than those involved in intertiiirtent dosing. There is an increased potential for error when instructions are entered into a device (such as an infusion pump) that will carry out those instructions no matter how erroneous they are. Errors are likely co be sustained over the duration of the infusion, error detection may be delayed, and medications administered by continuous infusion tend to be more potent (such as vasoactive substances, sedatives and narcotics), which means that medication errors have a higher likelihood of causing harm (Apkon et ai. 2004).
The potential for drug errors associated with infusion pumps is particularly high because they are designed to be highly flexible in terms of parameters, such as drug dose and patient weight. An infusion pump may be used to treat a 151'kg adult one week and a 1 kg iniant the next. Hence, a typic.il infusion pump \\ ill be required to cover doses for adult patients weighing 35-2()i)kg. and paediatric patients weighing between 1-1211 kg. When pumps with no limits are able to cover large dose ranges, this will increase the chance of dose errors being made that are In, il)(i. or even 1000 times the prescribed amount. Eskew et al (2(iO2) cite several examples that demonstrate the error potential of infusion pumps. In one. a neonatal nurse reset an IV device thac was infusing at a rate of 0.8 ml/hour. While resetting the infusion volume the nurse inadvertently pressed the time function key instead of the volume key, and in so doing programmed an incorrect infusion duration. The shorter duration time recalculated the infusion rate to I89ml/ hour, resulcing in a 236-fold over-infusion. In another example, a physician ordered a ICU-Intensive care unit: IV-Intravenous; *ln: Schneider (2004) nitrogiycerin infusion with the dosing units specified as micrograms per minute (nicg/ min). The nurse programming the infusion pu]iip was accustomed to nitrogiycerin being prescribed in mcg/kg/min and programmed the infusion device using weight. The 7i)-kilogram patient received a 70-fold overdose of IV nitrogiycerin.
In the Flaatten and Hevroy study (1999), data from 9366 patients showed that 32% of all medication errors were infusion related and, even though it was only a point prevalence stndy of 426 instances. Husch et al (2005) identified that 66.9% of IV infusions pump medications had one or more errors associated with their administration. In a review of 1846 medication errors involving infusion devices, Hicks et al (2003) found that 8.7% resulted m harm. The niajorit\' of errors were due to incorrect programming. The situation is more extreme in the ICU because of the number of IV lines per patient. If a ward-based patient has an IV line, a t>'pical scenario may be that they have a tnaintenance infusion running together with intermittent bolus doses of an IV drug. A typical patient in the ICU may have five or six infusions running at one time, including inotropes, vasopressors and sedatives, and so the risk is magnified.
Categories of Infusion pump errors
A review of infusion pump errors in the literature provides an indication of error types associated with the use of standard infusion pumps. These can be categorized into four main areas, although there is some overlap between categories.
Multiple of ten errors
These occur when an infusion is set up with a dose or time that is a multiple of 10 higher or lower than the correct prescription. Eskew et al (2002) cited one example where the amount of morphine was entered as 100 mg in lOOnil instead of lOOOmg per lOOml. When the infusion device calculated the infusion rate based on the incorrect data input, the patient received a 10-fold overdose.
Unit errors
These are mistakes involving units of dose, weight or time, rather than simply the addition or omission of a number of zeros. One example is a unit error related to an insulin infusion in a paediatric ICU. The infusion should have been set up in units/ hour, but was instead calculated in units/ kg/hour, resulting in a 67-fold overdose (Hatcher et al, 2004 ).
Calculation errors
These occur where a mistake is made in calculating dose, rate or both. Examples are a vecuronium infusion that was calculated at 4.357 mg/kg/hour instead of ().05mg/kg/ hour (Maiashock ct al, 2004) , and an insulin infijsion that was correctly set to infuse at 7 units per hour, but miscalculated at the next dose to infuse 7 units over 5 hours (Hicks and Becker. 2006) .
Push button errors
These occur when the user pushes a wrong button on the device when programming the infusion. The most common error is pressmg the zero instead of the decimal point. In one example the infusion rate for a neonate was to be increased from 3.2 to 3.4 ml/hour. The nurse unintentionally pressed the zero in place of the decimal point, resulting in an infusion rate of 304 ml/hour instead of 3.4 ml/hour (Eskew et al, 2002) . In another case. Hatcher et al (2004) cite an instance where a nurse incorrectly entered 205 instead of 2.5 to deliver an 82-foId overdose of nitroprusside to a 3.3kg infant (Hatcher et al, 2t) 04).
The benefit of smart pumps
None of the above errors would be detected or prevented by standard infusion pumps. A smart pump, with hard limits, would prevent all of the above examples if the drug parameters entered into the pump were outside the limits of the drug library database (Table 2 ).
In one study the introduction of a smart pump system prevented 26 overdoses involving high risk and moderate risk medications in the first 2 months of operation. When the smart pump system was introduced, data demonstrated that 12.4% of all warnings resulted in errors being averted when the original data entry was changed as a result of the drug library alerc (Obsheatz, 2004) . When 50 smart pumps were tested at the Vanderbiit University' Medical Centre, the smart pump systems produced 900 alert messages that resulted in 99 potential infusion errors being averted during an 8-nionth period (Hatcher, 2004) , and in another study smart pumps prevented near misses in 7.2% of all identified events (Maddox, 2004) .
Smart pumps can have soft and/or hard limits, and there has been much discussion in the literature about the risk/benefit profile of each setting. Soft limits can be overridden by the clinician operating the pump, whereas hard limits cannot. In theory, soft iimits provide more flexibility, allowing clinicians to make the ultimate decision about parameters, such as infusion dose and rate. In practice, however, they can negate the whole purpose of having a drug library, which is to prevent clinicians from straying outside preset limits deemed to be within appropriate drug safety protocols.
A 19-ycar-old woman with a pulmonarv" embolus after caesarean section was prescribed an IV heparin bolus dose of 5<Hl O units followed by a heparin infusion at 1000 units/ hour. Following administration of the bolus dose the infusion was commenced and the pump inadvertently programmed to run at lOOOml/hour instead of lOOt) units/hour (20ml/hour). 13y the time the error was discovered, the patient had received more than 17000 units (a 50tlO unit loading dose and 12000 units from the infusion) in less than an hour. A smart pump with soft dosing limits for heparin had been used, but the nurse had bypassed the dose-checking technology and had used the pump in standard mode (Institute for Safe Medical Practices (ISMP), 2007).
When a wireless smart pump system with soft limits was evaluated for effectiveness, I'ratt (2004) found that clinicians overrode 95% of 1117 alerts warning the user that requested drug delivery was outside programmed limits. Only 57 alerts were not overridden, and 13 of these led to avoidance of harm when pumps were reprogrammed.
When comparing results for pre-and post-sniart-pump introduction, Larsen et al (2005) analysed the number of errors reported in the year before changing to smart pumps (2f)02) compared with the year after (2003) . Hospital-wide errors reported with continuous medication infusions decreased by 73% after the introduction of smart pumps. The error rate decreased from 3.1 to 0.8 per 1000 doses, and the number of 10-fbld errors decreased from 0.41 to 0.08 per 1000 doses. Kinncaley ct al (2003) found that when a smart pump drug library was implemented in the ICU atid operating room environments. there was a 50% reduction in the number of drug administration errors involving syringe pumps, as indicated by clinician reports. Finally, when data from 18 institutions using smart infusion technology were analysed, it was found that, in an average 350-bed hospital, IV medication safety' systems avert a potentially life-threatening IV progranuning error every 2.6 days and a potentially significant IV error every 1.9 days (Maddox, 2i)04).
Only one study has found smart pump technology^ to be of limited benefit, but this was a point prevalence survey that reviewed . 1 limited number of p;iticnts over a 9-hour period (Husch et al, 2(l(t5) . All other research demonstrates that smart infiision ptinips can significantly increase patient safety by preventing programming errors. In the US, pumps th.u do tiot have a dose error reduction systctn arc now rated as either'not rt 'commendi'd or unacceptiihlc' (Emergeticy (hire Research Itistitute, 2002) .
The case for smart Infusion pumps at St George's paediatric ICU 111 view of compelling evidence that sm.irt pu tups minmnze the risk of intusioti ptmip-rclatod drug errors, and provide a stand-alone systet-ii that is ininiediately effective at the point of adtmnistration. the authors decided to introduce .i smart pump system at St (iL-orge's paediatric ICU (The Orchestra Workstation with Base Intensive, Module DPS syringe pump and Module MVP volumetric pump, Fresenius Kabi AC¡, Ck-rmany). A review of some errors that occurred before introduction of the smart pLinip system, and of drug administration mistakes that were recently prevented by the smart pumpü, reveals more about the type of tiK-dication errors that this infusion pump systetn is able to detect and stop.
Examples of errors that occurred prior to smart pump introduction Ati atracurunii iiitiision was set up in nicg/ kg./tnin rather than mcg/kg/hour. The patient received 60 times the correct dose for 20 minutes. The basic principles of smart infusion technolog\-would not permit this programming error, as the unit parameters for individual drug infusions are pre determined ill the drug library.
A standard infusion pump was programmed with 200 mg of morphine in 50 nil dikietit instead of 2{)mg in 50ml. although the latter was in fact the concentration in the syringe.This resulted in the p.itienî receiving a ^significant under dose ot niorphtnc. The smart pump system would prevent such . 1 programming error as it is outside the concentratioti ratigc within the tiriig library.
An undiluted salbutaniol infusion, appropriate for delivery through a central line, was administered to an asthmatic patient via , 1 peripheral cannula resulting in a local burn injurv". The smart pump system wouKl produce a warning n-iessagc that peripheral solutions must be diluted.
A phenytoin infusion was reconstituted in 5"'i dextrose. However, phenytoin should not be diluted in dextrose soltitions because of precipitation of phenytoin acid. Witli the smart pump system a warning message wotild appear co alert the clinician to dilute in sodium ehloride.
Examples of errors prevented since the introduction of the smart pump A patient receiving a clotiidine infusion for sedation was not sufficiently sedated, so tile doctor rcqiiL'sted a boltis oí clonidinc. The smart piiinp drug library prevented administration of this bolus. IV boluses of clonidinc arc contraindic.itcti as this can cause proton nd hypotension, and therefore the ability to give bolus doses has been disabled via the drug library.
A Kl-year-old child on continuous venovenous haeniotiltration was receiving a heparin infusion.The infusion was charted as 1 lOOIU instead of 11 OHO lU in 50nil diluent, resulting in the filter clotting on tw-o separateoccasions prior to error detection. Since the introduction oí the drug library this error is no longer possible, because the incorrect concentration is below the permissible range for haemofiltration.
A heparin loading dose and infusion was prescribed ibr a patient on continuous veno-VL' nous haemofiltration. The load is 100IU/ kg, which for a 10.2kg infant is 1000IU. lîut . 1 dose of lOOOOIU was prescribed. Wlu'ti programming the infusion pump this load was not allowed as it was outside drug library permissible' limits. A poteiitially large dose error was averted.
Conclusion
When looking to upgrade infusion technology in St George's Hospital paediatric ICU, safety of drug adiiiinistration and a reduction in iniusion pump tlrug errors were oí paramount importance. Systems relying on hutnan monitoring and awareness were unlikely to provide the iticreniencal level of increased safety that were required. The authors also recognized that traditional iniusion pu tups do not incorporate any measure of fail-safe system that can tnonitor and police clinicians' input instructions. Additionally, there were no other medication error saicguard systems, such as computerized physiciati order entry and bar cotie medication administration; thcreibre, there was a clear need for a st.ind-.ilone system that would be inimediatcly eifective at the-point of administration.
After reviewing the literature and available options, it became clear that a smart pump system with a customized drug library and hard drug hunts would provide an effective solution ibr the authors' iCU. Qualitative data irom their ICU has demonstrated drug errors that would have been prevented by a smart (ninip system, together with errors that have been prevented since the system has been in place. The authors' audit data confirms that there has been a substantial reduction in the number of critical incidents involvitig iniusion systems in their paediatric ICU, and those involving niedication dose errors arc now rare.
In view of the background research, and in the light c-)f first-hand flinical experience, the authors now iirmly believe that smart infusion systems with hard Inn it customized drug libraries, provide a new niininiuni safety standard ibr intensive care related to itii'usiiin pump drug error reduction.
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